Pierre-Antoine Vervier

Pierre-Antoine Vervier

Pierre-Antoine Vervier

Pierre-Antoine Vervier is currently a Senior Principal Research Engineer. He obtained his Master's degree in Computer Science in 2010 from the University of Liège (Belgium). He obtained his Ph.D. from Telecom ParisTech (France) in 2014 on a topic related to the security of the Internet routing infrastructure.

Pierre-Antoine joined the research group in 2010. Between 2010 and 2013 he was involved in the European project VIS-SENSE. His research work has mainly been related to computer networks security. During his Ph.D. he designed and maintained for several years a real-time data collection and analysis infrastructure called SpamTracer for the study of attacks against the Internet routing (BGP hijacks). He is also actively working on the mining of large datasets for security intelligence and attack investigation.

Selected Academic Papers

Journey to the Center of the Cookie Ecosystem: Unraveling Actors' Roles and Relationships

In Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2021) Our analysis lets us paint a highly detailed picture of the cookie ecosystem, discovering an intricate network of connections between players that reciprocally exchange information and include each other's content in web pages whose owners may not even be aware.

Demystifying the IP Blackspace

18th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID 2015)
In this paper, we explore the misuse and abuse of the IP blackspace, a portion of the Internet IP address space that should not be used. We show that the IP blackspace is sometimes mistakenly used to host web services, such as, websites. We also show that cybercriminals exploit the blackspace to host malicious servers and launch attacks.

Malicious BGP Hijacks: Appearances Can Be Deceiving

In Proceedings of the 43rd IEEE “International Conference on Communications: Communications and Information Systems Security Symposium (ICC 2014)
This paper discusses the challenges of Internet routing anomalies and BGP hijacks investigations. With the help of a real-world potential BGP hijack case study, we describe our investigation process and highlight the challenges and limitations faced.

Spammers operations: a multifaceted strategic analysis

Security and Communication Networks (Wiley) (09 October 2012)
This paper explores several facets of spammers operations by studying their strategic behavior on a long‐term basis.

Before Toasters Rise Up: A View Into the Emerging IoT Threat Landscape

In Proceedings of the 21st International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID 2018)

Mind your Own Business: A Longitudinal Study of Threats and Vulnerabilities in Enterprises

In Proceedings of the The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2018)

IoT Security and Privacy Labels

In Proceedings of the ENISA Annual Privacy Forum (APF 2019)
We devise a concise, informative IoT labelling scheme to convey high-level security and privacy facts about an IoT device to the consumers so as to raise their security and privacy awareness.

SpamTracer: How stealthy are spammers?

In Proceedings of the 32nd IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (IEEE INFOCOM 2013)
In this paper we present SpamTracer, a system designed to collect and analyze the routing behavior of spam networks in order to determine whether they use BGP hijacks to stealthily send spam from stolen networks.

Mind Your Blocks: On the Stealthiness of Malicious BGP Hijacks

2015 Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium
In this paper, we analyse 18 months of data collected by SpamTracer, an infrastructure specifically built to answer that question: are intentional stealthy BGP hijacks routinely taking place on the Internet? The identification of what we believe to be more than 2,000 malicious hijacks leads to a positive answer.

Tiresias: Predicting Security Events Through Deep Learning

In Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2018)

Lean On Me: Mining Internet Service Dependencies From Large-Scale DNS Data

In Proceedings of the 33th Annual computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2017)
To assess the security risk for a given entity, and motivated by the effects of recent service disruptions, we perform a large-scale analysis of passive and active DNS datasets including more than 2.5 trillion queries in order to discover the dependencies between websites and Internet services.

Visual Analytics for BGP Monitoring and Prefix Hijacking Identification

IEEE Network (Volume: 26 , Issue: 6 , November-December 2012)
In this article, we give a short survey of visualization methods that have been developed for BGP monitoring, in particular for the identification of prefix hijacks. Our goal is to illustrate how network visualization has the potential to assist an analyst in detecting abnormal routing patterns in massive amounts of BGP data.

VisTracer: A Visual Analytics Tool to Investigate Routing Anomalies in Traceroutes

In Proceedings of the 9th Symposium on Visualisation for Cyber Security (VizSec ‘12)
This paper proposes VisTracer, a visual analytics tool specifically tailored for the analysis of traceroute measurements for the purpose of uncovering routing anomalies potentially resulting from BGP hijacks.

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